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Arthur Joseph Hungerford Pollen (13 September 1866 – 28 January 1937) was an English journalist, businessman, and commentator on naval affairs who devised a new computerised fire-control system for use on prior to the First World War. His most important technical innovation was one of the world's first electrically-powered analogue computers, patented as the Argo Clock: a differential analyser which enabled big guns to engage with long-range targets when both ships were moving at speed in different directions.
On 7 September 1898 he married Maud Beatrice, the only daughter of the leading Conservative politician Joseph Lawrence, (later Sir Joseph Lawrence, Bart.) who was also chairman of Linotype & Machinery Co. Ltd.Confirmed by F. C. Burnand, The Catholics Who's Who & Year Book 1908 pp. 326–328. Available online via Google Books. For Linotype & Machinery Co. Ltd., see . See also Linotype machine. With Maud he had one daughter, who died aged four, and two sons.The elder son was Arthur Joseph Lawrence Pollen (1899–1968) who married 1926 Hon. Daphne Baring, a daughter of Baron Revelstoke and had issue. Their granddaughter is Clare Asquith nee Mary Clare Pollen. In 1898 Pollen was made the managing-director of Linotype, which he ran successfully for the next decade.
However first accurate data is needed of the target's position and relative motion. Pollen developed a plotting unit (or plotter) to capture this data. He added a gyroscope to allow for the Yaw angle of the firing ship. Again this required substantial development of the, at the time, primitive gyroscope to provide continuous reliable correction.Pollen 'Gunnery' p. 36 Pollen used the resources of Linotype for his work, specifically the services of a designer named Harold Isherwood. Trials were carried out in 1905 and 1906, which although completely unsuccessful showed promise. To further the development of fire control, Pollen set up in 1909 the Argo Company, and in 1911 took a holding in the firm of Thomas Cooke & Sons of York, who had been manufacturing components for his equipment.
Early on Pollen was encouraged in his efforts by the rapidly rising figure of Admiral Jackie Fisher, Admiral Arthur Wilson and the Director of Naval Ordnance and Torpedoes (DNO), John Jellicoe. Many officers in the navy were naturally interested in the prospect of being able to have ranges calculated for them so that they could achieve a greater rate of hits against the enemy. In early 1906, while presenting his planned "Aim Correction" system to naval officers, he met for the second time a promising gunnery lieutenant, Frederic Dreyer. The nature of Pollen's work involved close cooperation with the Navy, and upon Dreyer's appointment as Assistant to the DNO with responsibility for fire-control he was invited to view Pollen's Linotype works at Broadheath, near Altrincham. Pollen had had a long relationship with Dreyer's predecessor, Lieutenant Harding.
Pollen continued his work, with tests carried out on Royal Navy warships intermittently. Equipment was repeatedly purchased, despite the misgivings of successive DNOs Reginald Bacon and Gordon Moore.
Dreyer began producing his own fire-control computer. The fundamental difference between the systems was that the Dreyer system was a "dual rate" approach that plotted ranges and bearings separately, versus time rather than using a single rangefinder to take both ranges and bearings to drive the drawing of a plan view of own and target ships, as in the Argo system. The systems differed in other particulars.
The single prototype Dreyer Fire Control Table (called simply "the Original") did not include a gyroscope, though the first adopted for service in 1912—the Mark III—did. Conversely, the automatic plotting of rangefinder readings on the Original Dreyer table and early service examples was later discarded in favour of manual plotting keyboards which were capable of plotting the data of multiple rangefinders. Dreyer played a key role within the Admiralty in deciding which system to use, and always chose his own.
Certain aspects of the Dreyer Table Mk III were found by a subsequent Royal Commission to be similar to Pollen's work and £30,000 compensation was paid to Pollen in 1926 based on a theoretical number of his Argo units which might have been fitted in Royal Navy ships, most of which were never constructed. Pollen's supporters have argued that the poor performance of Naval gunnery at the Battle of JutlandPollen 'Gunnery' p. 180 and at GallipoliPollen 'Gunnery' p. 173 was due to the shortcomings of the Dreyer system, but others cite the tactics of the commander of the British battlecruisers, Vice-Admiral David Beatty.Pollen 'Gunnery' pp. 231–249
After news of the Battle of Jutland broke in Britain, based on German reports of victory Pollen attempted to redress the shortcomings of official reports issued by the Admiralty. A terse statement of facts known to them, had invited the worst possible interpretation of events. Writing for the 'Westminster Gazette' he attempted to stress the strategic result of the engagement, that the German fleet had fled from the Grand Fleet. Pollen also tried to persuade other reporters to take this line. This response to the news was in contrast to many other leading newspapers, which only belatedly began to regard the battle as a victory.Pollen 'Gunnery' pp. 151–155 Pollen was generally supportive of the establishment and the Admiralty but on occasion he disagreed publicly with their handling of the war. Commentators, such as Winston Churchill had written articles observing that British supremacy at sea was secured by the dominance of the British fleet over the German, even though no battle had been fought. This was in accord with theories of sea power, such as advocated by Alfred Thayer Mahan. Pollen argued that the cost in this case of the unresolved conflict was that Germany retained significant control of the Baltic Sea and tied up the larger part of the British fleet patrolling the North Sea. The fleet might otherwise have been used combating submarine attacks.Pollen 'Gunnery' pp. 159–162
In April 1917 Pollen wrote an article in Land and water critical of the way the war against submarine attacks was being conducted and against failures in administrative organisation of the Admiralty. This was followed by another article of 3 May arguing Britain had lost control of the seas in the face of mounting losses of merchant shipping to submarines, which was suppressed by the official censor. Reaction to the censorship of a respected columnist inevitably led to greater publicity of the issue than if the article had been published and its contents became known. The Admiralty had resisted introducing a convoy system for merchant ships for some time, believing it was impractical and that too few naval vessels were available as escorts. By the end of April the Admiralty had agreed to start forming ships into convoys, although it remains a source of debate to what extent this was a result of public pressure, the direct intervention of the prime minister, David Lloyd George or the natural result of convoy trials already being conducted. Although there was great concern at mounting shipping losses and shortages of materials and food, it also remains unclear to what extent the situation was sufficiently critical to have affected Britain's ability to conduct the war.Pollen 'Gunnery' pp. 203–212
In June 1917 Pollen embarked on a visit to America to discuss possible sales of Argo systems. He was approached by John Buchan, Director of Propaganda in the British Foreign Office, asking that he could publicise the work of the navy while there and encourage the development of the American navy. Pollen sought to address a perception amongst Americans that the British fleet had failed to defeat the German fleet, or resolve the submarine issue, thus leaving American ships open to attack. It was felt that his position as a critic of British policy added to his credibility when defending it. The success of his visit led to an offer by the British government of a knighthood and salary, should he return to America and continue a propaganda campaign. Pollen declined, arguing that he would be received entirely differently if acting in an official capacity than as an independent commentator.Pollen 'Gunnery' pp. 215– 224
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